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Stochastic Multiattribute Acceptability Analysis: an 
application to the ranking of Italian regions 
 
 
 
Abstract  
We consider the issue of ranking regions with respect to a range of economic and social variables. 
Departing from the current practice of aggregating different dimensions via a composite index, 
usually based on an arithmetic mean, we instead use Stochastic Multiattribute Acceptability Analysis 
(SMAA). SMAA considers the “whole space” of weights for the considered dimensions. The 
methodology is applied to the ranking of Italian regions, showing that although the North-South 
divide is definitely wider than the one measured simply in terms of GDP, there are Southern regions 
which perform generally better than those belonging to their broad region: a kind of Northern 
regions within the broader Southern region.  
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Stochastic Multiattribute Acceptability Analysis: an 
application to the ranking of Italian regions 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The measurement of regional socio-economic performance has become increasingly 
significant particularly in those countries characterised by persistent economic dualism 
such as Italy. Indeed, defining a comprehensive framework to assess regional 
performance is a crucial factor in both designing and evaluating regional policy.  
Moreover, the inclusion of the subjectivity in the evaluation exercise is crucial as 
measures taking into account subjectivity “have the potential to improve the policy 
making process, give citizens and decision makers more accurate information about 
quality of life and thereby significantly increase the toolkit of evidence-based measures” 
(Kroll and Delhey, 2013).   
Despite the crucial importance of indicators for socio-economic performance to support 
effective regional policymaking taking into account also the subjective aspects of the 
evaluation, the actual measurement of regional socio-economic performance is far from 
being clear cut and unambiguously resolved. This is due to several problems founded on 
both technical and conceptual grounds. The most widely-used measures of economic 
performance are GDP, or alternatively Gross Value Added (GVA)1. However, there 
clearly remains long-standing general criticism about its validity as a measure of 
wellbeing dating back to 1934 (Kuznetz,1934) and more recently addressed, among 
others, by Kubiszewski et al. (2013), Costanza et al. (2009), and Stiglitz et al. (2009). 
                                                 
1 GVA is equal to GDP plus subsidies less taxes on products. Of course, the choice between GDP and 
GVA does not affect comparison of regions within a country, because differences between regions are the 
same according to both measures.  
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Furthermore, once applied to a regional setting, important additional caveats also 
become manifest. Arguably, GDP is a reasonable measure if the scope of the analysis is 
more narrowly limited to the measurement of the regions’ output. Nevertheless, it is not 
able to capture, for example, neither regions’ income, nor regional productivity 
(Dunnell, 2009).  
These observations on the validity of GDP and other one-dimensional indices to 
measure wellbeing pave the way for the use of composite indices to provide an overall 
evaluation through the aggregation of different dimensions (or ‘criteria’). This rationale 
underpins, for example, the use of the Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) (Annoni 
and Kozovska, 2010; Annoni, 2013) which builds upon the Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI), published annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF) (Schwab, 2009; 
Schwab and Porter, 2007), and the World Competitiveness Yearbook by the Institute for 
Management Development (IMD, 2008).  
Although composite indices such as the RCI give an overall evaluation of social, 
economic, and environmental conditions that are perhaps preferable to reliance on GDP 
and other one-dimensional indices, there still remain some methodological questions 
raised by their adoption. Ideally one would like different dimensions to be aggregated in 
a manner that achieves some desirable technical properties such as (i) neutrality (where, 
all ranked countries or regions are be treated equally), or (ii) monotonicity (where an 
improvement in performance should not result in a deterioration in ranking position).  
Nardo et al. (2008) suggest that, in the spirit of the well-known impossibility Arrow 
theorem (Arrow, 1951), there does not exist any perfect aggregation rule. Accordingly, 
two main pragmatic solutions can be considered:  
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- Following the Borda rule which assigns a score to each country or region 
according to the following procedure: Each unit (country or region) receives one 
point for each one of the n dimensions in which it is the last, two points for each 
dimension in which it is the last but one, and so on until the n points for the 
dimensions in which it is first. Finally, these points are then summed up; 
- Following the Condorcet rule, which is based on the pairwise comparison 
between alternatives, counting the number of dimensions that are in favour of 
one alternative over another one.  
All the proposed aggregation rules can be broadly condensed into these two basic 
approaches. Whichever aggregation procedure is actually adopted, a crucial issue 
remaining for any ranking (or evaluation) exercise generating a single index based on 
socio-economic characteristics, is the choice of weighting system. The WEF (1999)’s 
methodology considered in Lall (2001, p.98) contends   
the weighting system is a priori; the report says that “it was based on the economic 
literature”, but which part of the literature yields the weights is left to imagination. 
Where in the literature, for instance, weight for finance as compared to technology 
come from? Can it be defined on economic grounds? The answers are not clear 
(p.1516).    
 
 
Moreover, with regard to the aforementioned RCI the advocates of this measure 
explicitly admit that the RCI is “the result of a long list of subjective choices” (Dijkstra 
et al., 2011, p. 16). From a broader perspective, the central issue in ranking different 
entities is twofold:  
(i) different attributes are considered;  
(ii) different weights for the considered attributes are used.  
The latter is perhaps the most pernicious problem. Indeed, with respect to the possibility 
of considering different dimensions, it is always possible to enlarge the set of 
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considered dimensions to include all the aspects being relevant for almost anybody 
interested in the ranking. However, even if two individuals could agree on the set of 
considered dimensions, it is very rare, or even impossible, that they could completely 
agree on the weights to be assigned to those dimensions, due to, for example, 
fundamental differences in personal preferences.  Let us remark that consideration of 
weights, or more, in general, of a given preference attitude cannot be avoided in 
aggregating different dimension. Indeed, putting together heterogeneous dimensions 
such as life expectancy, education, and per capita income in the Human Development 
Index, require always to answer to questions such as: given a certain level of each 
considered dimension and considering a certain decrement of one of them, how large 
should be the increase in one of the other two in order to maintain the overall level of 
satisfaction? These questions and other similar ones are unavoidable even if the 
dimension are measured in quantity terms by the National Statistical Institutes or 
similar institutions. In fact, in the context of the domain of the well-being measures, 
these questions are the analogous of the decision on how much to reduce the production 
of butter to increase the production of guns proposed by Samuelson in his famous text-
book (Samuelson, 1948). Of course, if it is reasonable to admit that each individual has 
his/her own answer to this question so that each one could theoretically fix the quantity 
of butter that according to his/her preferences is worthwhile to be exchanged with a unit 
of gun valid, it is also pacific that this quantity of butter is not the same for each one. In 
the context of the well-being measure the ratio between the weight of life expectancy 
and education represents exactly how much “units of education” the considered 
individual is willing to sacrifice in order to increase of one “unit” life expectancy. 
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Therefore, considering a plurality of these weights amounts to consider a plurality of 
individuals having different preferences.      
Indeed, despite the proliferation of composite socio-economic indicators (for a review 
considering more than 160 different indicators see Bandura, 2008), the weights set is 
clearly the manifest problem for composite indices such as, the popular Human 
Development Index (see, among others, Saisana et al. 2005; Permanyer, 2011; Cherchye 
et al. 2008, and Foster et al. 2009).  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) attempts to 
overcome the weighting issue by preferring to present a set of nine headline indicators2  
(OECD, 2014) for 362 OECD regions rather than a single composite indexto “present 
the information in such a way that users can consider the relative importance of each 
topic and bring their own personal evaluations to the questions” (OECD, 2014, p.8). 
Arguably a range of indicators is potentially even more difficult to communicate than a 
single metric. 
This study argues that there is still some space for a more conceptually flexible 
approach ranking by composite index, where additionally one can more explicitly take 
into account the scope for attaching different weights to any considered dimensions 
(Helliwell, 2003; Helliwell and Barrington‐Leigh, 2010). The Stochastic Multicriteria 
Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) (Lahdelma, Hokkanen and Salminen, 1998) method 
offers this possibility as it considers the whole set of possible weights (approximated 
through a very large sample of randomly extracted vectors of weights). In this way, it is 
possible to determine the probability by which each region is first, second, third etc. in 
performance ranking. Moreover, for each pair of regions it is possible to define the 
                                                 
2 The considered dimensions are income, jobs, housing, education, health, environment, safety, civic 
engagement, and accessibility of services. 
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probability that one region is better than another or vice versa, in every possible 
pairwise comparison. Considering the whole set of possible vectors of weights, 
introduces a degree of subjectivity in the ranking and amounts to considering all the 
sensitivities, ranging from extreme values taking into account only one or few 
dimensions, to the more even-tempered, taking into account all the dimensions. Instead, 
the usual approach considering a single vector of weights levels out all the individuals 
collapsing them to an abstract and unrealistic set of “representative agents”. Instead, 
considering a probability distribution of vector of weights can be interpreted as taking 
into account a population in which preference represented by each vector of weights are 
distributed according to the considered probability.  For example, if it 35% the 
probability of weight vectors having the weight of dimension gi, wi, greater than the 
weight of dimension gj, wj, than this can be interpreted as consideration of a population 
in which fraction of individuals for which wi > wj is 35%. Thus, in this perspective it is 
meaningful to consider the corresponding probability distribution of a ranking, rather 
than a single “representative” ranking that can amalgamate different preferences in the 
population hiding distribution of diversified ranking in the considered population. 
Observe also there is a second interpretation of the plurality of weight vectors. Indeed, 
each individuals can be imagined as composed by a plurality of selves (see e.g. Elster, 
1988), so that the probability of a given ranking can be imagined as the fraction of 
multiple selves of a given individual for which holds the ranking at hand. In this 
perspective, the consideration of a multiplicity of weight vectors can be considered as 
the correspondent of a consideration of a multiplicity of priors in the economic models 
of decision under uncertainty (see e.g. Gilboa et al. 2010, Minardi and Savochkin, 
2015). Of course the two interpretations of a plurality of weight vectors as representing 
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a population of individuals or the multiple selves of a single individual are 
complementary rather than alternative, so that one can imagine a population of 
individuals each one having a plurality of selves. According to these interpretations, a 
plurality of vector of weights relieves robustness concerns compared to composite 
indices. In this respect, several techniques have already been popularised (see for 
example, Saisana et al., 2005; Nardo et al., 2008). Even non-academic institutions like 
the European Institute for Gender Equality have implemented such techniques for the 
construction of composite indices such as the European Gender Equality Index (EGEI, 
see especially chapter 3 in EGEI, 2013). However, in all these approaches the focus is 
on the stability of the obtained results without any systematic exploration of the whole 
range of possible weights. For example, in the EGEI report, robustness analysis of the 
Gender Equality Index is performed considering a certain number of scenarios (i.e. 
“models”) drawn from the combination of 4 alternatives for weighting (2 kinds of equal 
weights, principal components analysis, AHP (Saaty, 1988)), 3 aggregation operators 
(arithmetic, geometric and harmonic mean) and missing data imputation (100 
simulations). In this way 3,636 sets of scores were computed. The median for each of 
the 27 States within these 3,636 possible scenarios has been computed and, then, the 
“best index” is the one that minimises these differences and lies closest to the median. 
Even this complex procedure does not systematically explore the whole spectrum of 
possible weighting schemes as the SMAA does, instead. 
 In this study we apply SMAA to the ranking of Italian regions with respect to social, 
economic, and environmental aspects. Despite the conspicuous methodological 
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difference3, this study closely aligns with the OECD initiative ‘How’s life in your 
region?’ (OECD, 2014) which aims to understand “…people’s level of well-being and 
its determinants […] to gear public policies towards better achieving society’s 
objectives.” (OECD, 2014, p. 4).  
In the light of this OECD claim and by using SMAA, we have directly been able to 
explore the full range of possible weight vectors, because we explicitly consider the 
whole spectrum of preferences and attitudes towards different aspects of well-being. Put 
crudely, a businessman might be more interested in economic performance aspects 
rather than in environmental performance aspects and a student might be more 
interested in social performance aspects. These diversified appreciations of various 
aspects of quality of life, determine a consequently different weighting of the 
considered criteria. Therefore, it could be reasonable to expect that some regions would 
be more preferred by some categories of individuals, while other regions would be 
preferred by others. This would be shown by some probability of being in the first rank 
positions despite their ranking based on GDP only.  More specifically, with respect to 
the Italian North-South divide, one could expect that there could be some even small 
probability for the Mezzogiorno regions to be in the first positions for a given set of 
weights. Nonetheless, our research shows that this is not the case and this can be 
interpreted in the following manner. Southern regions of Italy are the less preferred for 
all the different categories of citizens, regardless of their relative preferences about the 
different dimensions of well-being. Essentially this is the core original contribution of 
our research to the discussion of the Italian regional dichotomy. Namely, our study 
shows that the strong performance of the North regions is widespread and generalized to 
                                                 
3 As discussed in section 3 the OECD addressed the weighting issue by renouncing to the composite 
index approach in favour of a set of headline indicators.  
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all the categories of stakeholders. This conclusion is confirmed and reinforced using a 
class of multidimensional Gini indices and polarisation indices based on the ranking 
acceptability indices that measures both the concentration and the polarisation of the 
probability of obtaining a rank position not worse (or not better) than a given level. The 
interest of these multidimensional Gini and polarisation indices is related to the 
interpretation of the probability of an alternative a to attain a given ranking position r in 
terms of fractions of a population (in which the weight vectors of individuals are 
distributed accordingly to the considered probability) for which a attains ranking 
position r. Therefore, for example, a high multidimensional Gini or polarisation index 
for the first ranking position expresses a great concentration or polarisation in the 
population with respect to the alternatives considered the best. A similar conclusion can 
be drawn taking into account the interpretation of the multiple selves of a given 
individual. In any case, the fact that these multidimensional Gini and polarisation 
indices, originally proposed in this paper, confirm the gap between the North and South 
of Italy with more nuance than Gini indices and polarisation indices related to single 
indicators, must be interpreted in the sense that the perception among the population of 
concentration and polarisation of the best well-being (and conversely of the worst well-
being) is stronger than the concentration and polarisation of single components of the 
same well-being.    
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that SMAA method is applied to the 
performance ranking of regions and, more generally, for ex-post ranking of territorial 
entities according to their relative performance, instead of an ex-ante evaluation within 
a decision-making process. The proposed methodology can be adapted to study other 
geographic areas with likely different results. Accordingly, it would be valuable to 
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investigate which categories of individuals tend to prefer one region over another. With 
respect to the Italian case, the most salient point is the stability in finding the south 
regions across all categories of individuals as the worst regions.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 positions the methodology with respect to 
the ranking of regions. Section 3 illustrates our proposal for a new ranking of Italian 
regions. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. From subjective objectivity to objective subjectivity in regional economic 
ranking 
In Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) problems (Greco et al. 2016; Ishizaka 
and Nemery, 2013) a set of alternatives A={a1,…,am} is evaluated based on a set of 
evaluation criteria G={g1,…,gn} in order to deal with decision problems such as choice 
of the best alternative or ranking of all the alternatives from the best to the worst. For 
example, in regional development ranking, the alternatives are the regions of the 
considered country (e.g., in the case of Italy, twenty regions) and the criteria are the 
dimensions with respect to which these regions should be evaluated (e.g., environment, 
cultural heritage, social capital and so on). The value function most commonly used to 
aggregate the evaluations of alternatives from A with respect to criteria from G is the 
weighted sum, which, after assigning a non-negative weight wi to each criterion giG, 
w1+…+wn=1, gives to each alternative akA, the following overall evaluation: 
 
 
eq. (1) 
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It is worth noticing that different types of means can be expressed in terms of a 
weighted sum of some transformation of the evaluations gi(ak). In greater detail, in the 
case of quasilinear means (see Aczel, 1948 and section 4.3.1 in Grabisch et al., 2009) 
we have  
       
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with f being a strictly monotonic function. If f(x)=log(x), the quasilinear mean becomes 
the weighted geometric mean  
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Let us point out that, with respect to the arithmetic mean, the geometric mean has the 
advantage of not being completely compensatory because it does not permit to perfectly 
rebalance worse evaluations on one criterion with better evaluations on other criteria. 
Indeed, the non-compensatoriness of composite indices has been a largely discussed 
issue (see e.g. Munda and Nardo, 2009, Casadio Tarabusi and Guarini, 2013, Mazziotta 
and Pareto, 2016) and the most adopted aggregation function to avoid complete 
compensatoriness is the geometric mean that has been recently adopted for the Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2010).  
Very often one considers a simple arithmetic mean of the evaluations gi(ak) that criteria 
giG gives to alternatives akA, that is to assign an equal weight to each criterion. Two 
main questions arise: how is the ranking of an alternative ak changing when the weights 
of considered criteria change? Given two alternatives ak and ah from A, is it larger the 
set of vectors of weights wi for which ak is preferred to ah, or that one for which ah is 
preferred to ak? 
eq. (2) 
eq. (3) 
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Within MCDA these questions were addressed by the Stochastic Multiobjective 
Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) (Lahdelma, Hokkanen and Salminen, 1998; Lahdelma 
and Salminen, 2001; for two surveys see Tervonen and Figueira, 2008 and Lahdelma 
and Salminen, 2010). SMAA belongs to the family of MCDA methods aiming to 
provide recommendations on the problem at hand considering uncertainty or 
imprecision on the considered data and preference parameters.  
In order to handle imprecision with respect to the weights assigned to the criteria and to 
the evaluations taken on criteria under attention, SMAA considers two probability 
distributions fW(w) and fχ(ξ ) on W and χ, respectively, where  
W = {(w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Rn: wi ≥ 0,  i=1,…n, and w1+ . . . +wn=1} 
and χ is the evaluation space, i.e. the space of the value that can be taken by criteria 
giG.   
First of all, SMAA introduces a ranking function relative to the alternative ak: 
 
where ρ(false) = 0 and ρ(true) = 1. 
Then, for each alternative ah, for each evaluation of alternatives ξ ∈ χ and for each rank 
r = 1, . . . , l, SMAA computes the set of weights of criteria for which alternative ak 
assumes rank r: 
 
SMAA is based on the computation of the following indices: 
• The rank acceptability index: it is the measure of the set of weight vectors and 
evaluations on considered criteria for which the alternative ak gets rank r: 
eq. (4) 
eq. (5) 
eq. (6) 
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r
kb  represents the probability that alternative ak has the r-th position in the preference 
ranking. Let us remark that the rank acceptability index can be abridged to the Borda 
rule approach, because it is based on a scoring of each alternative. Moreover, the 
alternatives ak for which 
1
kb >0, i.e. the alternatives for which there exists at least one 
vector of weights for which they are the best, correspond to the efficient alternatives in 
the Data Envelope Analysis (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1987).  
• The central weight vector: it is the barycentre of the set of weight vectors for which ak 
is the best alternative and, consequently, it represents the preferences of the average 
individual giving to ak the best position. It is formulated as follows: 
 
Of course, one can consider also the barycentre of the set of weight vectors for which ak 
is the worst alternative, representing the preferences of the average individual giving to 
ak the worst position. 
• The confidence factor: it gives the frequency with which an alternative is the most 
preferred one using its central weight vector and it is given by: 
 
 
Another interesting index in SMAA is the pairwise winning index (Leskinen et al., 
2006), which gives the frequency that an alternative ah is preferred or indifferent to an 
eq. (7) 
eq. (8) 
eq. (9) 
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alternative ak in the space of possible weight vectors and possible evaluations on single 
criteria: 
 
Therefore, the pairwise winning index is more in the line of the aforementioned 
Condorcet rule, because it is related to comparisons of couples of alternatives. 
From a computational point of view, the multidimensional integrals defining the 
considered indices are estimated by using the Monte Carlo method. It is worth 
observing that in case the evaluations on criteria are known and therefore the only 
variability remains on the vectors of weights (w1, . . . , wn), which are supposed to be 
uniformly distributed in the simplex W, then one can compute the pairwise winning 
indices phk using the exact formula given by Zheng and Zheng (2015). However, this 
formula cannot be used to compute the ranking acceptability indices krb  and, moreover, 
for the values phk the estimates supplied by the Monte Carlo method are surely 
acceptable (e.g. Tervonen and Ladhelma (2007) shows that 10,000 extractions are 
enough to get an error limit of 0,01 for krb  with a confidence of 95%).    
In our application, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a distribution fW(w) on W  that 
assigns to each criterion weights with a uniform probability on the interval [0,1] with a 
subsequent normalization returning a weight vector in W.. Moreover, again to remain as 
simple as possible, we have not considered the probability distribution fχ(ξ) in a first 
computation in which imprecision in the data was not considered and, again, a specific 
uniform distribution in a second computation in which robustness with respect to errors 
in the measurement was tested. However, as explained in the following section, we have 
eq. (10) 
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taken indirectly into account imprecision in the data through the normalization we have 
adopted.    
We also use the rank acceptability index krb  to define a new multidimensional 
generalization of the Gini index developed as follows.  First, for each r=1,…,n-1 let us 
consider the upward cumulative rank acceptability index of position l, l=1,…,n-1, as the 
probability that an alternative ak has a rank position l or better (Angilella et al. 2016), 
that is 

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
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Now one can compute the Gini index of the upward cumulative rank acceptability index 
of position l, that is  
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Gl measures the concentration of probability to attain rank position l or better among 
the considered alternatives. The Gl based on the rank acceptability indices krb , takes 
into account all the possible vectors of weights and it is not based on a specific and to 
some extent arbitrary single vector of weights, as it is the case in the multidimensional 
concentration indices proposed in literature (for a review see e.g. Savaglio 2006 and 
eq. (11) 
eq. (12) 
eq. (13) 
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Weymark 2006).  An index analogous to Gl but measuring the concentration of 
probability to attain rank position l or worse, l=2,…,n, among the considered 
alternatives can be defined analogously as  
)1(2
1 1
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where  

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
n
ls
k
s
k
l bb , 
is the downward cumulative rank acceptability index of position for alternative ak 
(Angilella et al. 2016).  
The two classes of inequality indices Gl and Gl  are related as shown by the following 
result. 
Proposition. For any l=2,…,n, the following property hold 
.
1
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Proof. Since the probability of an alternative ak to be ranked in position l or worse is the 
complement of the probability to be ranked in position l-1 or better, that is  kl
k
l bb 11   , 
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eq. (14) 
eq. (15) 
eq. (16) 
eq. (17) 
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Besides Gini indices Gl and Gl, upward and downward cumulative rank acceptability 
indices can be used to define a class of polarisation indices (Esteban and Ray 1994, 
Esteban et al. 2007, Wolfson 1994), measuring how much polarised is the probability to 
live in a region having a rank position l or better or the probability to live in a region 
having a rank position l or worse. Details are reported in appendix.  
It is worth noticing here that the polarisation indices EGRl and EGRl have 
multidimensional nature so that they have to be evaluated also as a contribution to the 
literature on multidimensional polarization indices (see e.g. Gigliarano and Mosler, 
2009; Sheicher, 2010; Aleskerov and Oleynik, 2016). 
In what follows we apply the SMAA methodology to the ranking of Italian regions 
(spatial alternatives A={a1,…, am}) using a set of socio-economic and environmental 
variables as evaluation criteria (G={g1,…,gn}) to be evaluated according to the set of 
vectors of weights W.  
 
3. Application to performance ranking of Italian regions  
Building upon Guerrieri and Iammarino (2006)4 we apply the aforementioned SMAA to 
rank the 20 Italian regions according to a set of 65 indicators belonging to the newly 
introduced ‘BES5: Equitable and Sustainable Well-being’ database (ISTAT, 2015). The 
ranking related to these variables contains a large amount of information on many 
                                                 
4 It is worth noticing that Guerrieri and Iammarino (2006) already provided an analysis more 
comprehensive than the one based on a single indicator. Nonetheless, the methodological approach is 
substantially different. Guerrini and Iammarino (2006) adopt the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to 
“obtain new summary-variables to encapsulate all the information available through linear combinations, 
while at the same time identifying the interdependencies among the original variables” (p. 170).   
5 From the Italian Benessere Equo e Sostenibile.  Website: http://www.istat.it/en/archive/180526. The 
data used in the analysis refer to year 2014 as it represents the most recent year for which a balanced 
dataset can be extracted. See Appenidx A for details.  
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aspects of regional development; one that goes well beyond the mainstream measure(s) 
of regional economic output (e.g. GVA or GDP). This choice is in line with the idea of 
the multi-dimensionality of quality of life widely accepted in the literature (Stiglitz et 
al., 2009; OECD, 2011). As it is well known, Italy has a long history of economic 
dualism dating back to the unification process in 1861 (Del Monte and De Luzenberger, 
1989; Spadavecchia, 2007; Torrisi et al. 2015). Our results confirm such a socio-
economic dualism along with the several dimensions here considered. Building upon 
Pike et al. (2012, pp. 17-18) we preliminary explore the spatial disparities considering 
the issue of concentration and polarisation of the selected indicators, separately. Indeed, 
it is well known that inequality measures could be low despite the presence of a strong 
polarisation (Esteban and Ray, 1994). Table 1 reports measures of concentration (Gini 
index) and polarization EGR (Esteban, Gardìn, and Ray, 2007) index for each of the 65 
variables.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
From Table 1 it is worth stressing that there are variables showing levels of 
concentration and polarization much higher than the Households Disposable Income 
(HDI)6 (Gini index of 0.10 and an EGR index of 0.06). Overall, the inequality measures 
range from 0.02 (SOC3) to 0.47 (ENV3). Furthermore, two key aspects - Employment 
and Social Conditions - show Gini indices as high as about 0.26 (WORK2) and 0.21 
(SOC7) and an EGR index of 0.15 and 0.10, respectively.  
In the following we investigate the dualism between Southern and Northern Italian 
regions taking into account a synthesis of the above dimensions. Details about the 
normalisation procedure are reported in appendix.  
                                                 
6 As shown in Table A.1 the variable Econw1 refers to HDI.  
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For illustrative purposes, we begin with the evaluation according to the usual arithmetic 
mean (equal weights) of the performances normalized on the interval having as extreme 
the minimum and the maximum evaluations. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
After the data were normalised , performances of Italian regions were aggregated using 
a weighted geometric mean, because it allows one to avoid complete compensatoriness 
as discussed in Section 2. Both the resulting composite indices are shown in Table 2.  
As expected, in both cases Northern regions have overall a better performance than 
Southern ones. For example, in both rankings Trentino Alto Adige achieves the first 
position followed by Friuli-Venezia Giulia. As for the bottom five positions, Calabria 
ranks 16th, followed by Basilicata, Apulia, Sardinia, and Campania for the composite 
index based on the arithmetic mean, while for the composite index based on the 
geometric mean, in the same rank position there are Basilicata, Calabria, Apulia, 
Campania and Sicily. The most striking differences between ranking regards Sardinia 
and Sicily, with the former being 19th in the ranking based on arithmetic mean and 13rd 
in the ranking based on geometric mean, and the latter being 13rd and 20th, 
respectively.  The Kendall Tau of the two rankings is 0.811.  
Afterwards, to carry out further analysis of this ranking, we used the SMAA approach 
on the composite index based on geometric mean with the aim of exploring the whole 
space of possible weight vectors considering the whole spectrum of possible individual 
preferences. In this perspective one could expect that some region could be more 
preferred by some categories of individuals, while other regions could be preferred by 
others. This would be proved by some probability of being in the first rank positions 
also for regions that usually are at the last positions of the usual rankings. More 
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specifically, with respect to the Italian North-South divide one could expect that there 
could be some even small probability for the Mezzogiorno regions to be in the first 
positions. Our research shows that this is not the case and this can be interpreted as 
showing that Southern regions of Italy are the less preferred by all the different 
categories of citizens. This is the key original contribution of our research to explaining 
the Italian dichotomy. That is, our study shows that the prevalence of the North regions 
is widespread and generalized to all the categories of stakeholders. In fact, our approach 
is based on the answer to the following question: how robust is the observed dualism 
with respect to the relative importance granted to each dimension? Despite its crucial 
relevance, indeed, the above question can have only limited or no answer according to 
the mainstream approach based on weighted arithmetic mean of an opportune 
transformation of considered dimensions. This approach is followed, for example, by 
the EU to build the EU Regional Competitiveness Index7 (Annoni and Kozovska, 2010; 
Dijkstra et al., 2011).  Indeed, the weighting issue is still controversial and even 
sophisticated attempts to achieve a common weighing framework to be applied to 
composite wellbeing measures have not been fully convincing (for a general discussion 
about the weighting issue as applied to well-being measures see, for example, Decancq 
and Lugo, 2008). Nonetheless, mainstream composite indices of regional socio-
economic performance do not allow for differences in the weighting system and are thus 
effectively maintaining an unwarranted mask of objectivity. They implicitly assume 
equal weighting which may not be justified with respect to the preferences of different 
groups of individuals. The equal weighting assumption runs counter to a policy world 
                                                 
7 Although we acknowledge that the cited index does perform a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness 
of the weighting vectors, it is worth stressing that it limits the analysis to a given interval (Dijkstra et al., 
2011) with range lower or equal to 0.2 according to the development stage. Similarly, with respect to the 
UK case, Huggins (2010) tests the robustness of the UK Competitiveness Index by means of alternative 
single values for the chosen weights.   
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that values local preferences, and hence runs counter to the seminal contributions 
founded on their importance. These relate to different preferences for sets of local 
public goods according to the Tiebout (1956) model and further developments in fiscal 
federalism building upon the work of Oates (1972).  
The OECD proposed overcoming the weighting issue by presenting a set of nine 
headline indicators8 rather than a single composite index (OECD, 2014) for 362 OECD 
regions. Arguably, this approach is potentially even more difficult to communicate to 
the public and decision-makers alike. 
The SMAA approach can make a substantial contribution to achieve a better balance in 
the debates regarding the trade-off between a composite index and a range of indicators. 
On the one hand, SMAA allows for maximum variety in the relative evaluation of each 
dimension of wellbeing. On the other hand, in principle, it does not prevent computation 
of a composite index based on a set of regional characteristics. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to apply SMAA as a method offering a broader methodological perspective 
in tackling the measurement of regional well-being.  
Following the SMAA approach, we considered a uniform sampling of 1,000,000 of 
weights vectors. In order to take into account differences in the weighting of each 
characteristic (concerning dimensions of regional social, economic, and environmental 
performance) – potentially reflecting differences in preferences - we explicitly highlight 
the unavoidable subjectivity behind any ranking exercise simply through applying the 
SMAA approach. Table 3 reports the resulting ranking.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
8 The considered dimensions are income, jobs, housing, education, health, environment, safety, civic 
engagement, and accessibility of services. 
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For the sake of clarity, rather than reporting Rank Acceptability Index (RAI), i.e. the 
ratio between the occurrences a region achieves a given rank and the total number of 
cases considered, in Table 3 we preferred to show the Rank Frequency (RF). Therefore, 
Table 3 reports the number of occurrences, out of the 1 million cases, a region achieves 
each possible ranking from 1 to 20, depending on different weights assigned to each of 
the 65 considered dimensions. Indeed, numerical approximations could assign a 
misleading null probability to some RAI in cases in which, even if with a small number 
of occurrences, RF is not null. However, when there is no risk of these misleading 
conclusions, we refer to RAI rather than to RF (because, of course, RAI=RF/1,000,000). 
In Table 3, for example, one can see that Piedmont never ranks 1st or 2nd and it ranks 
3rd in 10 times out of the 1 million cases considered. Furthermore, it never ranks 12th 
or worse (i.e. the related RF is null).  Furthermore, for each extraction, the set of vectors 
of weights generating a given ranking can be stored. Hence, an interesting by-product of 
the analysis is represented – for each region – by the set of weight generating its best, 
that is the central weight vector recalled in section 2, and worst performance in terms of 
ranking. Table 4 reports the five criteria with greatest average weights in the set of 
vector of weights assigning the best position to the corresponding region. Table 5, vice 
versa, reports the five criteria with greatest average weights corresponding to the worst 
position of considered region. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The analogous tables with the weights of all criteria can be found in electronic 
appendix. The information about the weights giving the best and the worst position 
supplies interesting elements to analyse the key factors determining good and bad 
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evaluations by citizens. For example, Trentino-South Tyrol is the most preferred region 
for almost all the vector weights and thus it is not surprising that the average vector of 
weights assigning it the first position is giving substantially an equal weight to all 
criteria. However, it is interesting to investigate which is the average vector of the 
weights for which Trentino-South Tyrol is attaining its worst position (being the 4th) 
when the greatest weights are taken by criteria HEALTH3 (0.03), WORK8 (0.03), 
WORK6 (0.029), HEALTH5 (0.025) and POL2 (0.025), that, therefore, are the criteria 
more important for the average individual appreciating Trentino-South Tyrol to a lesser 
extent. We have also tested the stability of the central weight vectors for the four 
regions for which is not null the probability to be the most preferred by computing the 
relative confidence factor (details are reported in appendix) and we can conclude that 
the indications supplied by the central weight vector are quite stable. 
Going back to Table 3 – considering all the variations in weights – the analysis confirms 
the North-South divide according to the wider perspective at hand. Based on a rather 
comprehensive set of indicators, including but not confined to Income, and a 
comprehensive set of possible weights, Northern and Centre regions perform generally 
better than Southern regions. On this regard, it is worth stressing here three main 
elements. First, only Centre-Northern regions (Trentino-South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Emilia Romagna, and Tuscany) ranked first at least once. Second, only Southern 
regions (Campania, Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily) ranked last at least once. Third, their 
best rank is as low as 16th (Campania), 16th (Apulia), 9th (Calabria), and 17th (Sicily). 
However, within the group of the four above regions under consideration, Calabria 
achieves its highest rank of 9 in just 2 cases out of the million cases here considered. 
Within this big picture, Sardinia represents a notable exception. Indeed, its best rank is 
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5th (though in just 30 out of the million cases considered), its lowest rank is 17h, and it 
achieves with its highest frequency the 13th rank in 318,317 cases out of the 1 million 
cases considered, hence, in about 1/3 of cases. The contrast with the other main island is 
sharp. Indeed, Sicily, as already mentioned, never ranks better than 17th and its highest 
RAI of about 66% (i.e. about 2 out of 3 cases) corresponds to the last rank.  
On the same premise, although Table 3 reports the RF for all ranks, in what follows the 
analysis will focus on the highest RF for each region. The argument for this is that the 
rank related to the highest RF for each region is the rank the region achieves with the 
highest probability, and, therefore, with the highest level of robustness. Table 3 shows 
that the region with the highest RF in the first position is Trentino Alto Adige (with a 
RAI of 99.96%). Friuli-Venezia Giulia achieved the highest RF in the second position 
(with a RAI of 45.63%). Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, and Aosta Valley, achieved the 
highest rank in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th position with a RAI of 43.37%, 50.06%, and 31.64%, 
respectively. That is to say, Trentino Alto Adige achieves the first position in this 
ranking exercise with a rather massive degree of robustness to the choice of different 
weighting vectors. On the same premise, the data related to the other four 
aforementioned Centre-North regions achieve the subsequent four ranks with a 
substantially high robustness (at least in 30% of cases).  
Piedmont shows a datum of similar magnitude with its highest RAI of 45.94% referring 
to the 5th position. The remaining positions show a quite high degree of variation with 
maximum RAIs between 25.34% (Lazio, 12th position) and 91.51% (Calabria, 17th). 
Nonetheless, the Southern highest RAIs lay in the area characterised by a rank of 13 or 
worse, yet, with the already mentioned exception of Sardinia; furthermore, Southern 
highest RAIs are never below the threshold of 30%.  
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From a slightly different angle, as far as the bottom five positions are concerned, our 
analysis confirms that the general wisdom concerning the Southern generalised low 
performance has a robust basis. Indeed, Basilicata, Calabria, Apulia, Campania, and 
Sicily show their own highest RAI in the 16th, seventeen17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th rank. 
with RAIs of 89.64%, 91.50%, 70.71%, 55.21%, and 66.46%, respectively.   
The above results do confirm that the North-South divide is definitely wider than the 
one measured simply in terms of Income. Moreover, the geographical divide is robust to 
a massive variety of weighting choices. In other words, it is not reasonable to imagine a 
set of weight vectors able to result in a different overall picture in terms of regional 
disparities.      
To further address this issue, building upon Angilella et al. (2013), Table 6 reports the 
upward cumulated RAIs klb  for each rank.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Therefore, for any rank, values in Table 6 show the probability of achieving at least that 
rank. For example, while Piedmont achieves a rank of 4 or above9 with probability 
0.002, Aosta Valley ranks 2nd or better with probability 0.003, and so on so forth.  
From Table 6, it is worth noticing that 4 regions out of 20 have a probability of (or very 
close to) 1, to be ranked 5th or better. Namely, Trentino Alto Adige, Emilia Romagna 
(probability of 0.996), Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Tuscany. Conversely, there are 
regions like Marche and those from Abruzzo to Sardinia (in the order they appear in 
Table 6), with a null probability of belonging to the group of top five regions. In order 
to provide an even more intuitive representation of this evidence, Graph 1 shows a map 
of the cumulated RAIs reported in Table 6. 
                                                 
9 In that precise case the number represents exactly the probability to achieve rank 4 as the probabilities 
related to higher ranks are null.  
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INSERT GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE 
The Italian dualism is apparent with only Northern regions having a chance to belong to 
the group of top five regions according to different weighting vectors. A 
complementary10 Graph 2 below reports the probability of belonging to the group of 
bottom 5 regions.  
INSERT GRAPH 2 ABOUT HERE 
Graph 2, while confirming from a different perspective the evidence reported in Graph 
1, offers interesting elements of differentiation between Southern and Islands regions. 
First, a white area emerges in the heart of the darkness of Southern regions competing 
in the Italian regional “relegation zone”: it refers to the Basilicata datum (probability of 
only 0.078). Similarly, Abruzzo has a 0.03 probability of belonging to the same group. 
Sardinia even shows a null probability of belonging to the group of bottom five regions. 
To some extent, therefore, according to this peculiar perspective, Abruzzo, Basilicata, 
and Sardinia represent a kind of Northern regions within the broader Southern region. 
Put differently, in a broader Southern region generally lagging behind the Northern one, 
Abruzzo, Basilicata, and Sardinia perform generally better than the regions belonging to 
their broad region.  
The RAI approach allows the comparison of regional performance along the cross-
sectional dimension. Thus, by comparing RAIs we are able to compare the overall 
probability of achieving a given rank between regions. For example, as noted above, the 
4th position is achieved by Piedmont in about 0.2% of cases, while Aosta Valley 
achieves the same position in about 6% of cases. Nonetheless, RAIs fail to provide a 
direct comparison of the two regions. RAIs tell us that, overall, Piedmont performed 
                                                 
10 Data reported in Graph 2 come from applying the complement rule to probabilities related to rank 16 
reported in Table 8 4. 
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better than 15 regions and worse than four other regions in about 0.2% of cases. Or, in 
the cumulated case, the same region (Piedmont) performed at least better than 16 other 
regions in about 0.2% of the cases. However, neither the simple RAIs nor the cumulated 
ones are able to give information about the direct comparison between two regions. For 
example, what is the probability of Piedmont achieving a rank higher than the 
neighbour Lombardy? Or, with regard to the previous case, what is the probability of 
Piedmont achieving a rank better than Aosta Valley?  
Clearly, an answer to this kind of questions is crucial in both policy design and policy 
evaluation as they provide information on the relative performance of potentially similar 
jurisdictions. In order to answer this kind of questions, we provide in Table 7 the 
Pairwise Comparison Index (PCI) for each couple of regions.   
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Table 7 shows the pairwise winning indices phk  that gives the region ah the probability 
to obtain a better score than region ak. Thus, figures reported in each row represent 
relative frequencies of the region in that row achieving a score higher than regions 
reported in columns according to the rule ‘row wins against column’. Hence, regarding 
the previously mentioned direct comparison Piedmont vs Lombardy, Piedmont achieved 
a better score than Lombardy in about 78% of cases. Of course, symmetrically 
Lombardy performed better than Piedmont in about 22% of cases. The last column of 
Table 7 reporting the Average PCI (APCI) aims to provide a synthetic measure of the 
overall performance of each region with respect to other region. Thus for a region ak , 
the corresponding APCI, denoted qk, is given by the arithmetic mean of the PCI pkh  of 
region ak with respect to other regions ah, that is 
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Of course, the APCI ranges from zero (i.e. the region achieves a lower score than the 
remaining 19 in all cases considered) to 1 (i.e. the region achieves a better score than all 
the “opponents” in all cases). Therefore, Trentino Alto Adige (APCI of 111), Tuscany 
(API of 0.908), and Emilia Romagna (APCI of 0.876) confirm to be “champions” also 
according to this peculiar perspective. On the other edge, Sicily with an APCI of only 
7% confirms all its weakness in this context. Furthermore, in terms of North-South 
divide, Table 7 shows that from Abruzzo to Sicily, in only very minor occurrences a 
Southern region achieves a better score than regions belonging to the Centre-North 
broad region. Noteworthy, Sardinia has a better performance than the Southern 
Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, and Sicily in all the cases here considered. In 
12,5% of cases it performs even better than the Northern Veneto.  
For the sake of conciseness, we do not analyse all the pairwise comparisons reported in 
Table 7. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing here that our approach allowing the direct 
comparison of pairs of regions unveils patterns of both similarity and dissimilarity even 
within the same broad region. In so doing, it makes a substantial contribution aiming to 
go a step further the already widely researched North-South divide.  
Finally, building upon Pike et al. (2012)let us apply to this analysis indices Gl and Gl 
that are shown in Table 8 along with the polarisation indices EGRl and EGRl to 
explore spatial inequality and polarisation according to the proposed multidimensional 
perspective They confirm a great concentration, especially for the best rank positions, as 
shown by the very high values of Gl for small l, and for the worst rank positions, as 
                                                 
11 The exact value being equal to 0.99997475. 
eq. (18) 
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shown by the very high values of Gl for great l.  Let us observe that the levels of 
concentration are not only much higher than the Households Disposable Income, but 
also of all the inequality measures of single indicators shown in Table 1. The same 
evidence overall applies to EGR indices.   
This further proves that the comprehensive North-South divide is exacerbating the 
concentration present in the considered attributes taken singularly and, moreover, it is 
not related to a given vector of weights assigned to the considered criteria, because the 
RAI on which Gl and G  are based take into account the whole variety of all possible 
vectors of weights. Table 8 reports the whole set of Gini indices.  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Since each variable may be affected by measurement error, (see e.g. LeSage 1999), we 
have further taken in consideration perturbations in the values assigned to each region 
by the 65 variables of the BES dataset. Details about the procedure are reported in 
appendix. The results show that our ranking exercise is robust to substantial differences 
in measurement.  
To summarise: the existence of the North-South divide in Italy is empirically robust to a 
detailed consideration of a wide variety of dimensions, weighting choices, and 
measurement errors.   
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The SMAA technique has been justified, explained and applied to the performance 
ranking of Italian regions. This involved a set of socio-economic and environmental 
indicators, including but not confined to GDP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to explore differences in local development using such an approach 
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permitting to take into consideration different preferences of different class of 
individuals corresponding to different weight vectors. In the Italian regional context 
characterised by a strong and persistent dualism, this exercise has two main features. 
First, it allows for a validation of computational results based on prior knowledge of 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects the Italian regions built over decades of 
research involving the questione meridionale (Southern question). To some extent the 
analysis at hand confirms that (i) the North-South divide is definitely wider than if 
measured simply in terms of GDP and that (ii) the presence of uneven patterns of 
regional development seem robust to an extensive massive variety of weighting choices 
and perturbations of values on the dimensions considered (thus taking into account also 
measurement errors).  
Second, our approach based on SMAA methodology is able to unveil patterns of spatial 
disparities more clearly than seems present in the extant empirical literature on the 
Italian North-South divide. Our analysis finds clear-cut and robust evidence of a 
generalised better performance of Sardinia with respect to the other big island (Sicily) 
and, overall, with respect to the broader Southern region. This study has also proposed a 
class of original multidimensional concentration and polarisation indices. With regard to 
concentration we propose Gini indices that measure the concentration of the probability 
of attaining good or poor ranking positions. Similarly, we propose a novel 
multidimensional extension of the EGR index to analyse the polarisation of the above 
probabilities. These indices measure a gap between the North and South of Italy that is 
even more severe than the indices related to single dimensions would indicate.       
The implementation of more advanced techniques to unveil and highlight the 
subjectivity involved in any ranking of territorial units is open for future research 
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attention. Specifically, more advanced models could be developed to take into 
consideration the interaction between criteria (Angilella, Corrente and Greco, 2015) and 
the hierarchy of criteria (Angilella, Corrente, Greco and Slowinski, 2015). Nonetheless, 
our exploratory analysis demonstrates the utility of the SMAA approach – which is even 
potentially applicable in cross-national comparisons. It is able to make a substantial 
contribution to achieve robust evaluation of the relative socio-economic performance 
moving from ‘subjective objectivity’ and towards more ‘objective subjectivity’.  
Essentially, the SMAA approach can objectively take into consideration the ‘inner 
subjectivity’ of all evaluation derived from aggregation of different dimensions with the 
full spectrum of different weighting choices.    
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                   Table 1 – Disparities in social, economic, and environmental indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
                  Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015) 
Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators  
                  
Health    Education   Working Conditions   Economic Welfare   
Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR   
                  
Health1 0.06 0.03  Edu1 0.06 0.03  Work1 0.10 0.05  Econw1 0.10 0.06   
Health2 0.05 0.02  Edu2 0.09 0.05  Work2 0.26 0.15  Econw2 0.13 0.06   
Health3 0.12 0.06  Edu3 0.16 0.08  Work3 0.19 0.09  Econw3 0.29 0.15   
Health4 0.17 0.08  Edu4 0.17 0.08  Work4 0.22 0.11  Econw4 0.29 0.14   
Health5 0.16 0.07  Edu5 0.11 0.05  Work5 0.07 0.03  Econw5 0.16 0.07   
     Edu6 0.16 0.08  Work6 0.04 0.02  Econw6 0.29 0.15   
         Work7 0.02 0.01  Econw7 0.28 0.13   
         Work8 0.13 0.06       
  Work9 0.12 0.05   
Social Capital   Politics   Safety   Social Welfare   
Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR   
                  
Soc1 0.10 0.04  Pol1 0.09 0.04  Sfty1 0.22 0.11  Swel1 0.10 0.05   
Soc2 0.10 0.05  Pol2 0.05 0.02  Sfty2 0.38 0.19  Swel2 0.04 0.02   
Soc3 0.02 0.01  Pol3 0.04 0.02  Sfty3 0.39 0.18  Swel3 0.06 0.03   
Soc4 0.12 0.05  Pol4 0.05 0.02  Sfty4 0.12 0.05  Swel4 0.07 0.03   
Soc5 0.06 0.03  Pol5 0.07 0.03  Sfty5 0.12 0.06       
Soc6 0.19 0.08  Pol6 0.02 0.01  Sfty6 0.13 0.07       
Soc7 0.21 0.10  Pol7 0.02 0.01  Sfty7 0.08 0.04       
Soc8 0.11 0.05                 
 
          
  Table 1 – Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators (cont.)  
Disparities in SOC8al, economic, and environmental indicators (cont.) 
Land Use   Environment   R&D    
Quality of Life and 
SOC8al conditions 
Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR  Variable Gini EGR 
                 
Land1 0.20 0.10  Env1 0.38 0.18  Rd1 0.05 0.02  Ql1 0.39 0.21 
Land2 0.15 0.07  Env2 0.11 0.05  Rd2 0.06 0.03  Ql2 0.20 0.10 
     Env3 0.47 0.23      Ql3 0.11 0.05 
        Env4 0.06 0.03           Ql4 0.22 0.12 
                    Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015) 
 
  
 
Table 2 – Social, economic and environmental performance index (SEEPI) 
 
Region  
Aritmetic mean 
on original 
values 
normalized on 
the interval 
[min,max] Rank 
Geometric mean 
of z values  
normalized on 
the interval 
[M-3, M+3]  
 
 
 
 
 
Rank 
Piedmont 0.528 7 0.515 5 
Valle d'Aosta 0.552 5 0.513 6 
Lombardy 0.530 6 0.510 7 
South Tyrol - Trentino 0.644 1 0.597 1 
Veneto 0.525 8 0.486 10 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.566 2 0.545 2 
Liguria 0.508 9 0.491 8 
Emilia-Romagna 0.560 3 0.538 4 
Tuscany 0.557 4 0.544 3 
Umbria 0.507 10 0.489 9 
Marche 0.500 12 0.479 12 
Lazio 0.504 11 0.480 11 
Abruzzo 0.468 15 0.451 15 
Molise 0.475 14 0.459 14 
Campania 0.398 20 0.357 19 
Apuglia 0.400 18 0,367 18 
Basilicata 0.445 17 0.421 16 
Calabria 0.446 16 0.404 17 
Sicily 0.486 13 0.349 20 
Sardinia 0.400 19 0.463 13 
                                              Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015) 
 
 
  
 
 
             Table 3 – Rank Frequency 
 
Rank PI VA LO TR VE FR LI ER TO UM MA LA AB MO CM PU BA CA SI SA 
1 0 0 0 999575 0 37 0 97 291 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 2898 1 354 1 456340 0 175472 364935 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 13685 14 62 28 302865 0 249538 433796 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2406 60622 551 9 234 239232 12 500637 196262 11 1 21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 459397 316363 130609 0 7424 1514 2830 70271 4617 4798 315 1783 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 30 
6 417799 198102 320399 0 16417 11 15872 3729 90 20923 1409 4862 0 190 0 0 0 0 0 199 
7 106735 231232 457922 0 46031 1 65449 234 7 60977 6272 22980 1 786 0 0 0 0 0 1370 
8 13160 87659 72638 0 225310 0 303111 22 2 183239 29574 68277 29 2918 0 0 1 0 0 14063 
9 425 44262 13960 0 140473 0 252711 0 0 277223 99798 137621 137 8449 0 0 0 2 0 24939 
10 63 28263 3349 0 135533 0 174880 0 0 248078 188519 164327 839 19395 0 0 9 3 0 36743 
11 5 11950 485 0 162381 0 131240 0 0 142344 263167 175134 5328 44753 0 0 7 8 0 63196 
12 0 4405 65 0 141248 0 42665 0 0 49526 263389 253360 21152 95754 0 0 45 29 0 128360 
13 0 488 7 0 73239 0 9892 0 0 11924 109913 121075 115996 238797 0 0 264 89 0 318317 
14 0 67 0 0 37033 0 1245 0 0 926 32041 43764 290271 359241 0 0 1920 602 0 232891 
15 0 4 0 0 13849 0 86 0 0 25 5543 6639 541594 228176 0 0 23479 3984 0 176619 
16 0 0 0 0 609 0 7 0 0 6 58 150 21371 1393 1 2 896435 76815 0 3153 
17 0 0 0 0 189 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3282 97 617 2725 77825 915063 76 120 
18 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 193856 707119 15 3292 95717 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 552132 208143 0 111 239614 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 253394 82011 0 2 664593 0 
             Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015). 
            
 
 
 
  
                       Table 4 –  Criteria with the five  greatest  average  weights in the set of vector of weights assigning to   
                       the corresponding region the best position 
 HEALTH1 POL5 WORK4 SFTY2 LAND2 
Abruzzo 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 WORK3 SQ3 WORK8 SOC7 WORK5 
Basilicata 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.03 
 WORK8 SFTY6 SFTY2 WORK2 LAND2 
Calabria 0.031 0.031 0.03 0.027 0.026 
 POL4 LAND2 SQ1 WORK5 SQ2 
Campania 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 
 WORK8 HEALTH3 HEALTH1 POL1 POL7 
Emilia-Romagna 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 WORK8 WORK6 SFTY3 HEALTH3 SFTY6 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 ECONW3 HEALTH3 POL3 SFTY1 SOC3 
Lazio 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.027 
 EDU2 SFTY1 HEALTH2 POL3 RD2 
Liguria 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 SFTY1 ECONW7 SWEL2 SWEL4 SQ1 
Lombardy 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 SFTY6 SFTY1 RD1 HEALTH3 LAND1 
Marche 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 
 POL1 LAND2 HEALTH3 SFTY5 WORK2 
Molise 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 
 SFTY4 POL7 SFTY1 HEALTH5 ECONW5 
Piedmont 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.024 
 POL5 WORK5 SQ2 POL7 POL3 
Apuglia 0.031 0.03 0.028 0.027 0.026 
 SFTY1 EDU3 ECONW3 SWEL3 SQ1 
Sardinia 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 WORK4 ECONW5 LAND1 HEALTH5 POL6 
Sicily 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.022 
 HEALTH3 WORK6 POL2 WORK8 ENV2 
Tuscany 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 
 HEALTH1 HEALTH2 HEALTH3 HEALTH4 HEALTH5 
South Tyrol - 
Trentino/Südtirol 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 SFTY1 WORK6 ECONW3 HEALTH5 SQ1 
Umbria 0.03 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.024 
 ENV3 SQ3 WORK5 SFTY7 SFTY1 
Aosta Valley 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.02 
 HEALTH2 HEALTH5 POL7 SWEL3 RD1 
Veneto 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015) 
 
 
 
  
Table 5 –  Criteria with the five  greatest  average  weights in the set of vector of weights assigning to the 
corresponding region the worst position 
 
 SFTY6 SFTY5 SFTY4 HEALTH2 SOC3 
Abruzzo 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.02 0.02 
 POL6 POL7 HEALTH5 POL4 HEALTH3 
Basilicata 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.024 
 EDU6 WORK4 POL5 ENV2 HEALTH4 
Calabria 0.032 0.03 0.029 0.028 0.025 
 SFTY5 HEALTH2 ECONW7 SOC1 SOC2 
Campania 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 SFTY1 SFTY4 SFTY6 WORK6 ECONW5 
Emilia-Romagna 0.031 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.021 
 WORK3 ECONW3 SOC5 SQ3 POL3 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.031 0.031 0.03 0.03 0.029 
 SFTY2 HEALTH2 WORK8 SFTY4 SFTY7 
Lazio 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
 SWEL4 HEALTH1 LAND2 SFTY2 SWEL3 
Liguria 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 
 WORK3 LAND2 WORK8 WORK6 SFTY7 
Lombardy 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.024 
 SOC1 SWEL4 LAND2 WORK9 POL4 
Marche 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031 
 ENV1 SFTY6 WORK6 SFTY4 WORK8 
Molise 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.021 
 ENV2 HEALTH1 EDU2 ENV3 RD2 
Piedmont 0.031 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 
 SFTY3 SOC3 HEALTH5 SQ3 SQ4 
Apuglia 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 HEALTH1 EDU1 EDU2 WORK3 ECONW7 
Sardinia 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 ECONW2 WORK9 ECONW4 ENV1 SQ2 
Sicily 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 SFTY4 LAND1 WORK7 SOC5 POL7 
Tuscany 0.032 0.03 0.029 0.027 0.027 
 HEALTH3 WORK8 WORK6 HEALTH5 POL2 
South Tyrol - 
Trentino/Südtirol 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.025 0.025 
 WORK5 ECONW3 SFTY1 ENV3 HEALTH2 
Umbria 0.03 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 
 POL7 LAND2 SQ1 HEALTH3 ECONW3 
Aosta Valley 0.03 0.03 0.027 0.026 0.026 
 SFTY1 WORK2 SFTY2 HEALTH3 POL2 
Veneto 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.035 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015) 
  
         Table 6 – Cumulated Rank Acceptability Index 
  Rank 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
PI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.462 0.880 0.986 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VA 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.077 0.394 0.592 0.823 0.911 0.955 0.983 0.995 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.131 0.452 0.909 0.982 0.996 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.024 0.070 0.295 0.436 0.571 0.734 0.875 0.948 0.985 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FR 0.000 0.456 0.759 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.019 0.084 0.387 0.640 0.815 0.946 0.989 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ER 0.000 0.176 0.425 0.926 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TO 0.000 0.365 0.799 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.026 0.087 0.270 0.547 0.795 0.938 0.987 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.038 0.137 0.326 0.589 0.852 0.962 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
LA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.030 0.098 0.236 0.400 0.575 0.828 0.949 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.027 0.143 0.434 0.975 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.032 0.077 0.172 0.411 0.770 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.194 0.747 1.000 
PU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.710 0.918 1.000 
BA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.026 0.922 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.082 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.335 1.000 
SA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.041 0.077 0.141 0.269 0.587 0.820 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
                      Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
                       
                          Table 7 – Pairwise comparison index 
  PI VA LO TR VE FR LI ER TO UM MA LA AB MO CM PU BA CA SI SA APCI 
PI 1 0.579 0.787 0 0.974 0 0.995 0.005 0 0.993 0.999 0.997 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.76645 
VA 0.421 1 0.583 0 0.941 0.006 0.898 0.074 0.017 0.896 0.976 0.94 0.999 0.998 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.73745 
LO 0.213 0.417 1 0 0.962 0 0.954 0.001 0 0.948 0.989 0.989 1 0.998 1 1 1 1 1 0.998 0.72345 
TR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
VE 0.026 0.059 0.038 0 1 0 0.395 0.001 0 0.426 0.664 0.606 0.966 0.894 1 1 0.999 0.999 1 0.875 0.5474 
FR 1 0.994 1 0 1 1 1 0.692 0.529 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.91075 
LI 0.005 0.102 0.046 0 0.605 0 1 0 0 0.564 0.806 0.83 0.999 0.982 1 1 1 1 1 0.942 0.59405 
ER 0.995 0.926 0.999 0 0.999 0.308 1 1 0.295 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8761 
TO 1 0.983 1 0 1 0.471 1 0.705 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.90795 
UM 0.007 0.104 0.052 0 0.574 0 0.436 0 0 1 0.843 0.732 1 0.98 1 1 1 1 1 0.926 0.5827 
MA 0.001 0.024 0.011 0 0.336 0 0.194 0 0 0.157 1 0.482 0.978 0.896 1 1 1 1 1 0.829 0.4954 
LA 0.003 0.06 0.011 0 0.394 0 0.17 0 0 0.268 0.518 1 0.981 0.886 1 1 1 1 1 0.829 0.506 
AB 0 0.001 0 0 0.034 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.022 0.019 1 0.294 1 1 0.977 0.994 1 0.241 0.32915 
MO 0 0.002 0.002 0 0.106 0 0.018 0 0 0.02 0.104 0.114 0.706 1 1 1 0.998 0.999 1 0.407 0.3738 
CM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.231 0 0.001 0.71 0 0.0971 
PU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.769 1 0 0.003 0.859 0 0.13155 
BA 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.023 0.002 1 1 1 0.921 1 0.004 0.24755 
CA 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.006 0.001 0.999 0.997 0.079 1 1 0 0.20415 
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 0.141 0 0 1 0 0.07155 
SA 0 0 0.002 0 0.125 0 0.058 0 0 0.074 0.171 0.171 0.759 0.593 1 1 0.996 1 1 1 0.39745 
                        Source: authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015).  
 
 
 
  
 
Table 8 – Multidimensional inequality G-indices and Polarisation EGR-indices 
Rank (l) G
≥l G≤l EGR≥l EGR≤l 
1 0.9999 - 0.9663 - 
2 0.9092 0.0526 0.8441 - 
3 0.8716 0.1010 0.9015 0.0868 
4 0.8397 0.1538 0.9209 0.1434 
5 0.7741 0.2099 0.6025 0.1468 
6 0.7225 0.2580 0.4864 0.2145 
7 0.6728 0.3096 0.5232 0.3432 
8 0.6117 0.3623 0.4261 0.3382 
9 0.5555 0.4078 0.3500 0.3303 
10 0.5048 0.4545 0.3992 0.3466 
11 0.4576 0.5048 0.3153 0.3904 
12 0.4107 0.5593 0.3431 0.5225 
13 0.3605 0.6160 - 0.5853 
14 0.3106 0.6695 - - 
15 0.2628 0.7247 - - 
16 0.2100 0.7885 - - 
17 0.1579 0.8398 - - 
18 0.1030 0.8946 - - 
19 0.0503 0.9270 - - 
20 - 0.9561 - - 
        Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015). EGR weighted for population, alpha=1; beta=1. 
 
  
 
 
 
                                             Graphs 1 – Probability of belonging to the group of top five regions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(.75,1]
(.5,.75]
(.25,.5]
[0,.25]
Source: authors' elaboration on ISTAT (2015)
Probability of belonging to the group of top 5 regions
  
 
 
Graph 2 – Probability of belonging to the group of bottom 5 regions  
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APPENDIX  A 
 
 
 
 
 
A.1 Multidimensional polarisation indices 
 
The multidimensional Gini index has been developed as follows. We build upon the 
polarisation index proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994) corrected as proposed by Esteban 
et al. (2007). More precisely, with respect to the upward cumulative rank acceptability 
index klb ,  l=1,…,n-1, we computed the mean value 
M
lb of the upward cumulative rank 
acceptability indices klb , k=1,….,n, that is 
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With Pk, being the population of the k-th region,  k=1,….,n. After we calculated the 
normalized upward cumulative rank acceptability indices klb
~
, that is 
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On the basis of values klb
~
, we defined the cumulative distribution ]1,0[]1,0[: lF   such 
that for all x[0,1] 
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Following the methodology proposed by Aghevli and Mehran (1981) and Davies and 
Shorrocks (1989), we found also an optimal partition 
l of the distribution 
l
F

in r groups 
minimise the Gini index value of within-group inequality, r≤n, that is  
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Finally we computed the polarization index EGRl as follows: 
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with [1,1.16] is the sensitivity to polarization and ≥0. In our application to the study 
of Italian regions we considered 2 groups in the partition l , =1 and  =1. Analogous 
polarization indices EGRl, l=1,…,n-1,  can be defined with respect to the downward 
cumulative rank acceptability index klb . 
 
A.2 Data and normalisation procedure  
 
Table A.1 reports variables description along with summary statistics. Please note also 
that the last column of Table A.1 reports the categorization of each variable according the 
good/bad nature of the considered criteria. 
Taking inspiration from Mazziotta and Pareto (2016), to make comparable variables 
expressed on different metric we normalised them according to the following formula that 
assigns to each value x on a “good criterion”, that is a criterion with a preference 
increasing with respect to the assigned value (e.g. gross domestic product), the 
normalized value 
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where z is the z-score 
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eq. (A.5) 
eq. (A.6) 
eq. (A.7) 
with M and  being the mean and the standard deviation of the considered criterion, 
respectively, so that 
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In case of a “bad criterion”, that is a criterion with a preference decreasing with respect 
to the assigned value (e.g. the social exclusion), the normalized value x  of x is given by  
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that is, 
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The idea is to consider as extreme of the normalization scales the values M-3 and M+3 
within which lie 99,73% of values in case of normal distribution and, by the Chebyshev's 
inequality, 89% of values for any distribution for which an average and standard deviation 
are defined.   
For illustrative purposes, we begin with the evaluation according to the usual arithmetic 
mean (equal weights) of the performances normalized on the interval having as extreme 
the minimum and the maximum evaluations, that is 
 
eq. (A.8) 
eq. (A.10) 
eq. (A.9) 
𝑥?̃? =
𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
; 
in case of a “good criterion”, or 
𝑥?̃? =
𝑥𝒎𝒂𝒙− 𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
in case of a “bad criterion”.  
 
A.3 Robustness checks  
Stability of central weights.  
We have tested the stability of the central weight vectors for the four regions for which is not null 
the probability to be the most preferred by computing the relative confidence factor. We 
proceeded as follows. We generated perturbed evaluations on considered criteria for all the 
regions by extracting random values in the interval 
   [gi(a)-0.25i, gi(a)+ 0.25i] 
for the evaluations of each region a on considered criteria gi, where i is the standard deviation 
of the criterion gi, i=1,….,65. Taking the central weight vector of the region a* for which we test 
the stability of the weight vector giving it the best position, we computed the new ranking 
corresponding to the perturbed evaluations. We repeated this procedure 1,000,000 times and we 
got an estimation that the region a* remains the best. This probability is 100% for Trentino Alto 
Adige, 87.2% for Toscana, 84,5% for Emilia Romagna and 80% for Friuli-Venezia Giulia.   
Measurement error.  
To test the robustness to measurement error we have taken in consideration perturbations in the 
values assigned to each region by the 65 variables of the BES dataset.  More precisely, we 
considered an interval of variation  
eq. (A.11) 
eq. (A.12) 
[gi(a)-ki, gi(a)+ki] 
for the evaluations of each region a on considered criteria gi, where i is the standard deviation 
of the criterion gi, i=1,….,65 and k≥0. The case k=0 corresponds to the absence of any 
perturbation, that is, the case of RF in above Table 2. We further considered the case k=0.25, 
k=0.5 and k=1. In each one of these case and in each one of 1,000,000 of iterations we randomly 
extracted not only a vector of weights for the 65 criteria, but also a perturbed evaluation  ag i
~  in 
the considered range for each region a on each criterion gi, i=1,….,65. On the basis of the 
perturbed values, for each one of the 65 criteria considered by BES, we computed the “perturbed 
mean” and the “perturbed standard deviation” and we normalized according to equations (8) and 
(9) the perturbed evaluations  ag i
~ . The RF and the PWI corresponding to k=0.25 are shown in 
Table A.3 and Table A.4, respectively. The analogous tables for k=0.5 and k=1 can be found in 
the electronic appendix.  
In order to assess the consistency and reliability of the resulting ranking, the Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient (ICC) has been computed considering the above k=0.25, 0.5, and 1 as resulting from 
alternative evaluation exercises performed by 3 additional raters with respect to the actual 
measurement released by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. To this end, the consistency-
of-agreement ICC (CA-ICC) has been used. The rationale for adopting the CA-ICC is that 
different measurements are considered consistent if the scores from any two measurements (or 
raters) give the same ranking to all the regions (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979; McGraw and Wong, 
1996a, 1996b). The results reported in Table A.4 show that our ranking exercise is robust to the 
substantial differences in measurement here hypothesised. Indeed, both the individual and the 
average coefficients are in no occasion1 lower than 0.60 with 15 out of the 20 ranking here 
considered showing a ICC higher than 0.80. 
                                                          
1 All the ICC are statistically significant according to related F-test.  
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                  Table A.1 -  Variables description and descriptive statistics 
Variable  Description  Categorisation  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Health 
 
    
  
HEALTH1 Life expectancy without limitations in activities at age 65 Good 44.69 4.532909 38.6 52.6 
HEALTH2 Rate of mortality from dementia and diseases of the 
nervous system 
Bad 19.795 1.616519 16.5 22.3 
HEALTH3 People aged 14 and older who have at least one risk 
behaviour in alcohol consumption 
Bad 16.83 3.635946 10.7 24.3 
HEALTH4 People aged 14 and over who do not practice any physical 
activity 
Bad 39.135 11.79966 17.6 60.4 
HEALTH5 People aged 3 years and older who consume at least 4 daily 
servings of fruits and / or vegetables 
 
Good 17.62 5.246713 6.2 28.3 
Education 
 
    
  
EDU1 People 25-64 who have completed at least the secondary 
school 
Good 59.565 6.690155 47.2 70.1 
EDU2 People aged 30-34 who have completed a university degree Good 24.2 4.166533 17.4 31.6 
EDU3 Graduates who enrol for the first time at the university in 
the same year in which they graduated 
Good 13.995 4.328665 8.4 24 
EDU4 People 15-29 years neither in education, employment or 
training (Neet) 
Bad 25.115 7.691915 14.3 40.3 
EDU5 People aged 25-64 who participated in education and 
training in the 4 weeks preceding the interview 
Good 8.275 1.695776 5.1 12 
EDU6 People aged 6 and over who have practiced three or more 
cultural activities in the preceding 12 months 
 
Good 26.295 7.74627 14.8 42.1 
Working Conditions 
 
    
  
WORK1 Employment rate of the population aged 20-64 years Good 60.08 10.70015 42.4 73.6 
WORK2 Rate of non-participation in the work of the population 
aged 15-74 years 
Good 22.92 11.26805 9 42.7 
WORK3 Fixed-term employees and employees who started their 
current job for at least five years 
Good 20.205 7.301008 10.1 38 
Variable  Description  Categorisation  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WORK4 Rate of low-pay employees Bad 11.28 4.651497 6.8 22.4 
WORK5 Rate of overeducated employees Bad 23.16 2.860327 17.6 29.4 
WORK6 Employment rate of women aged 25-49 with at least one 
child aged 6-14 over total number of women 
Good 81.13 6.629844 67.3 92 
WORK7 Work satisfaction  Good 7.245 0.213923 6.9 7.7 
WORK8 Employment insecurity perception Good 10.74 2.627466 5.9 17 
WORK9 Share of involuntary part-time to total employment by 
gender 
Bad 11.845 2.518244 7 16.7 
Economic Welfare 
 
    
  
ECONW1 Average disposable income of households Good 17223.9 3245.781 12343 21286 
ECONW2 Index of inequality in disposable income Bad 5.16 1.302386 3.6 8.9 
ECONW3 People at risk of poverty Bad 19.36 10.29913 7.7 40.1 
ECONW4 People living in households with severe material 
deprivation 
Bad 10.96 6.194684 3.1 26 
ECONW5 People living in overcrowding situations, in dwellings 
without some services and with structural problems 
Bad 9.44 2.845569 5.5 15.7 
ECONW6 People under 60 years living in households with very low 
work intensity 
Bad 12.09 6.605811 4.6 25 
ECONW7 Subjective evaluation index of economic difficulty 
 
Bad 16.61 9.040896 4.6 38.4 
Social Capital 
 
    
  
SOC1 People aged 14 and over who declare themselves very 
satisfied of family relationships 
Good 33.73 6.012452 20.9 46.3 
SOC2 People aged 14 and over who declare themselves very 
satisfied with the friendly relations 
Good 24.02 4.593657 15.4 35.3 
SOC3 People aged 14 and over who have relatives, friends or 
neighbours you can count on 
Good 81.88 3.134461 74.5 88 
SOC4 People aged 14 and over who during the last 12 months 
they have played at least one social participation activities 
Good 24.015 5.632825 14.9 40 
SOC5 People aged 14 and over who talk about politics or that you 
inform policy at least once a week, who participated in 
online consultations or vote on social or political issues or 
Good 66.915 7.447166 53.7 75.7 
Variable  Description  Categorisation  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
have read and posted opinions on social and political 
problems on the web in recent 3 months 
SOC6 People aged 14 and over who during the last 12 months 
have carried out unpaid work for organizations or volunteer 
groups 
Good 10.255 3.782296 5 21.9 
SOC7 People aged 14 and over who during the last 12 months 
have funded associations 
Good 14.91 5.775802 5.7 28.8 
SOC8 People aged 14 and over who trust others  
 
Good 23.1 4.450429 17.3 33.6 
Politics 
 
    
  
POL1 People aged 18 and over who have voted in the European 
Parliament elections 
Good 57.46 9.097912 42 70.5 
POL2 People aged 14 and over who express confidence in the 
Italian Parliament 
Good 3.41 0.305907 2.8 4 
POL3 People aged 14 and over who express confidence in the 
judicial system 
Good 4.215 0.297843 3.4 4.8 
POL4 People aged 14 and over who express confidence in parties Good 2.355 0.230503 1.9 2.8 
POL5 People aged 14 and over who express confidence in the 
regional government, the provincial government or in their 
own town 
Good 3.72 0.503253 2.9 4.9 
POL6 People aged 14 and over who express confidence in the 
police and fire brigade 
Good 7.055 0.24165 6.6 7.5 
POL7 Average age of MPs - XVII Legislature - January 2014 
 
Bad 49.925 1.560322 45.9 52.5 
Safety 
 
    
  
SFTY1 Rate of theft in dwelling Bad 16.125 6.641724 4.9 31.9 
SFTY2 Rate of pickpocketing Bad 5.96 4.291289 0.9 16.5 
SFTY3 Rate of robbery Bad 1.56 1.132487 0.1 4.6 
SFTY4 Women 16-70 years old who have experienced physical 
violence in the last five years 
Bad 7.015 1.468359 4.3 9.3 
SFTY5 Women 16-70 years old who have suffered sexual violence Bad 6.165 1.361994 3.9 9.1 
SFTY6 Women 16-70 years old who have suffered physical or 
sexual violence in the last five years by region and division 
Bad 4.885 1.227867 2.4 7.6 
Variable  Description  Categorisation  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SFTY7 People aged 14 and over who feel safe walking alone at 
night in the area where they live 
 
Good 61.225 8.897361 49.8 82.6 
Social Welfare 
 
    
  
SWEL1 People aged 14 and over who have expressed a satisfaction 
score for life between 8 and 10 
Good 36.55 7.224993 20.6 54 
SWEL2 People aged 14 and over who say they are very or fairly 
satisfied Leisure 
Good 65.24 5.196497 56.3 75.7 
SWEL3 People aged 14 and over who feel that their situation will 
improve in the next five years 
Good 26.455 3.034273 22.3 34.6 
SWEL4 People aged 14 and over who feel that their situation will 
worsen over the next five years 
 
Bad 18.605 2.487331 13.5 22.9 
Land Use 
 
    
  
LAND1 People aged 14 and over who feel the landscape of the 
place in which they live is suffering from obvious 
degradation 
Bad 18.61 6.7765 7.8 32.6 
LAND2 People aged 14 and over who declare among the 5 
environmental problems for which express their concern 
for the landscape there is the ruin caused by excessive 
building activity 
 
Bad 16.665 4.363397 9.4 24.2 
Environment 
 
    
  
ENV1 Municipal waste landfilled Bad 39.83 28.26601 6.1 111 
ENV2 People aged 14 and over believe that the extinction of plant 
species or animal is between 5 their concerns 
Bad 17.385 3.36816 12.6 24 
ENV3 Electricity consumption covered by renewable sources Good 62.24 72.42566 10.4 310.2 
ENV4 People aged 14 and over who are very or fairly satisfied the 
environmental situation of the area in which they live 
 
Good 74.72 8.568276 57.2 89.6 
 
 
    
  
Variable  Description  Categorisation  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R&D 
 
RD1 Employed with university education in Scientific or 
Technological professions 
Good 14.97 1.622896 12.4 20 
 
 
 
RD2 People of 16-74 years who have used the Internet at least 
once a week in the preceding 3 months 
 
Good 58.95 6.595174 48.4 66.5 
Quality of Life and social conditions 
 
    
  
Ql1 Households reporting that the house is connected to the 
natural gas network 
Good 9.35 7.47068 1.4 30.7 
Ql2 Recycled municipal waste   Good 43.77 16.16729 12.5 67.6 
Ql3 Index of overcrowding of prisons Bad 105.03 21.4091 56.8 138 
Ql4 Households by great difficulty in reaching at least 3 
essential services 
Bad 6.835 2.894328 3.2 12.3 
                   Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015).  
 
  
Table A.3 - Rank Frequency (robustness test, k=0.25) 
Rank PI VA LO TR VE FR LI ER TO UM MA LA AB MO CM PU BA CA SI SA 
1 0 0 0 998815 0 166 0 341 678 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 4108 0 1002 2 445152 0 184418 365317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 190 17410 129 171 64 307539 1 261237 413255 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 11131 68928 2805 12 584 242603 89 462256 211434 58 9 83 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5 435991 293305 153725 0 9297 4424 5045 78754 8784 7382 651 2501 0 86 0 0 0 0 0 57 
6 393362 204409 312966 0 20750 112 21629 11129 469 24965 2504 7068 3 293 0 0 0 0 0 340 
7 136168 218117 409982 0 53052 4 75953 1672 57 67130 9556 25305 7 1061 0 0 0 0 0 1937 
8 21202 92997 90856 0 198641 0 282672 185 6 181407 39316 73612 68 3858 0 0 1 0 0 15178 
9 1626 48897 21816 0 137070 0 243843 8 0 261397 109332 137741 332 10556 0 0 2 1 0 27379 
10 296 30792 6292 0 130486 0 176477 0 0 235060 190695 163269 1736 23101 0 0 8 8 0 41781 
11 30 14480 1192 0 146759 0 129479 0 0 144362 254416 178354 8370 50893 0 0 30 13 0 71621 
12 3 5601 206 0 133506 0 49066 0 0 58667 240715 231382 32046 108336 0 0 105 46 0 140321 
13 0 784 29 0 80402 0 13395 0 0 17196 108877 119802 129500 233520 0 0 550 174 0 295772 
14 0 158 2 0 51442 0 2109 0 0 2281 36081 49578 295192 330359 0 0 3897 1040 0 227859 
15 0 14 0 0 33640 0 230 0 0 88 7734 10836 500080 233752 0 0 35021 5925 0 172680 
16 0 0 0 0 3139 0 11 0 0 6 107 441 28293 3850 8 18 862737 96525 3 4862 
17 0 0 0 0 1150 0 1 0 0 0 7 24 4372 331 1527 6393 97577 888164 244 210 
18 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 226384 673688 69 7717 92129 0 
19 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 555747 235253 3 367 208629 0 
20 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 216334 84648 0 20 698995 0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015).  
 
 
  
 Table A.4 - Pairwise Comparison Index (robustness test, k=0.25) 
  PI VA LO TR VE FR LI ER TO UM MA LA AB MO CM PU BA CA SI SA APCI 
PI 1.000 0.577 0.743 0.000 0.967 0.001 0.989 0.019 0.001 0.986 0.997 0.995 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.764 
VA 0.423 1.000 0.574 0.000 0.932 0.010 0.885 0.086 0.022 0.884 0.969 0.933 0.999 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.736 
LO 0.257 0.426 1.000 0.000 0.950 0.000 0.936 0.005 0.001 0.934 0.983 0.983 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.723 
TR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
VE 0.033 0.068 0.050 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.384 0.001 0.000 0.413 0.622 0.581 0.934 0.858 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.998 1.000 0.833 0.539 
FR 0.999 0.990 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.679 0.526 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.910 
LI 0.011 0.115 0.064 0.000 0.616 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.559 0.789 0.808 0.998 0.976 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.934 0.594 
ER 0.981 0.914 0.995 0.000 0.999 0.321 1.000 1.000 0.314 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.876 
TO 0.999 0.978 0.999 0.001 1.000 0.474 1.000 0.686 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.907 
UM 0.014 0.116 0.066 0.000 0.587 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.809 0.720 0.999 0.972 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.917 0.582 
MA 0.003 0.031 0.017 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.191 1.000 0.486 0.968 0.882 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.817 0.499 
LA 0.005 0.067 0.017 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.280 0.514 1.000 0.969 0.871 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.814 0.507 
AB 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.031 1.000 0.311 1.000 1.000 0.969 0.992 1.000 0.253 0.333 
MO 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.118 0.129 0.689 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.999 1.000 0.410 0.377 
CM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.266 0.000 0.002 0.745 0.000 0.101 
PU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.734 1.000 0.000 0.007 0.862 0.000 0.130 
BA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.031 0.005 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 1.000 0.006 0.247 
CA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.998 0.993 0.100 1.000 1.000 0.001 0.205 
SI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.255 0.138 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.070 
SA 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.183 0.186 0.747 0.590 1.000 1.000 0.994 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.401 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT (2015).  
Table A.4 – Intraclass correlation coefficients  
  Rank 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
                       
individual  1.00 0.99 0.98 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.91 0.79 0.62 0.70 0.67 0.80 0.77 0.65 
Average 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.93 0.88 
                       
F- test (19, 19) 803.94 354.44 196.93 29.82 45.34 58.79 32.39 39.81 61.10 63.29 36.18 22.47 39.28 16.46 7.56 10.13 9.19 16.73 14.53 8.37 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                                          
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A.4 - Regions abbreviations and macro-areas composition 
Nord-West 
Piedmont PI 
Aosta Valley VA 
Liguria LI 
Lombardy LO 
Nord-East 
South Tyrol -Trentino  TR 
Veneto VE 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia FR 
Emilia-Romagna ER 
Centre 
Tuscany TO 
Umbria UM 
Marche MA 
Lazio LA 
South 
Abruzzi AB 
Molise MO 
Campania CM 
Apuglia PU 
Basilicata BA 
Calabria CL 
Islands 
Sicily SI 
Sardinia SA 
 
